It has been argued that the inzherenzt risks of advance directives nmade by, healthy people are disproportioniate to the potenztial beniefits, particularly if the directive is imiplemiientable in cases of reversible niental incapacity. This paper niain tainls that the evidence for such a position is lacking. Furtherniore, respect for the principle of autoniomly requires that inidividuals be penrmitted to niake risky choices about their own lives as long as these do niot inipinhge on1 others. Eveni though health professionals have an obligation to try and ensure that patienits have appropriate informtiationi about possible fuiture tr-eatniienit optionis, they cannot predict anid describe everx' eventuality but nio1r can they disregard firni decisions kniowzvingly nmade on the basis of inconmplete informlationi by conipetenit adults. To attenipt to do so would be to reinstate notions of niedical paternalisni which are contrary to currenit public expectationzs.
identity and the continuity of mind and mental state as the important criteria. According to such arguments, the rupture caused by loss of competence is so great that it makes nonsense of the concept of personal continuity. A competent individual is not making advance decisions for herself but for the future relict of who she once was. Dr Ryan's argument is a variation on this theme and seeks to prove that in advance of disability, people are in such a totally different mind-set that they are "likely to grossly under-estimate their desire for medical intervention should they become ill". ' We do not agree with Dr Ryan's view that advance directives dealing with situations where the deterioration in mental capacity is potentially reversible should be abolished and take issue with him on the following points:
(1) His argument hinges on the notion that people are likely to under-estimate substantially their desire to have medical intervention should they become ill. The evidence for this is not convincing. Emanuel et al following a prospective study of 495 HIV-positive or oncology out-patients and 102 members of the public concluded that most people made moderately stable treatment choices and that recent hospitalisation did not decrease that stability. 3 Even if it is the case that in general the sick do not make the same choices as the healthy, there is evidence that this does not apply to people who have completed an advance directive. Although Danis et al found that patients who were hospitalised one or more times between baseline and follow-up interviews were more likely to change their choices and desire more treatment, patients who had a living will were more likely to maintain stable preferences. Indeed, patients who had living wills and chose the least amount of care at their initial interview had extremely stable preferences (96 per cent unchanged curtail their autonomy. Society generally recognises that individuals sometimes make bad or risky choices in the way they shape their lives. In our society, the libertarian legacy of Mill, however, assumes that individual choices should be permitted, unless they impinge on the rights of others. Mill's famous dictum was that "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection" and that an individual "cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the opinions of others to do so would be wise or even right".9 So, does it damage the fabric of society or the rights of other people to allow Jehovah's Witnesses, for example, the right to refuse in advance the administration of blood products in all circumstances, even when their condition is curable? Or should they, as Dr Ryan suggests, be forcibly treated and only then "their opinions regarding future treatment be sought again now that they are in the scenario that they had previously only imagined"?'
Common sense
It is trite to observe that people's views change with their circumstances. The philosopher, Parfit (iv) We believe that a retreat to medical paternalism is not a practical option in societies increasingly aware of patient charters and consumer rights. Many forms of advance directives offer the drafter a choice of specifying personal instructions and/or nominating a proxy to decide. American surveys show that the option most commonly chosen is for people to select decision-making by a family member or other proxy despite the evidence of a variable correlation between the judgments of nominated proxy decision-makers and the patients' own prior wishes." One study indicated that of 104 patients with life-threatening illness who were offered advance directives, 69 took up the offer and most asked for non-aggressive treatment if "the burdens of treatment outweigh the expected benefits". None, however, gave any other personal instructions,'2 although evidence suggests that proxies are more likely than patients themselves to opt for life-prolonging treatment, ie, to support more conservative choices than the individual would have made if competent and in that situation. '3 Dr Ryan contests one specific type of advance directive on grounds of utility and autonomy. He argues that it is contrary to utility to permit people to die when their lives could be prolonged and their condition improved. This might be true if utility were a matter of simply prolonging life rather than also a question of maximising happiness and choice and reducing misery, including the misery of families who may see their relative being resuscitated contrary to an informed and competent advance refusal.
Two autonomies
Nor is autonomy a simple matter. When an individual is conscious but mentally incapacitated, in Dworkin's view, "two autonomies are in play: the autonomy of the demented patient and the autonomy of the person who became demented. These two autonomies can conflict, and the resulting problems are complex and difficult". 14 Of course, some philosophers solve this by attributing no autonomy to the demented person and recognising the "residual interests" of the previously competent individual as paramount. A range of psychological and philosophical questions arise here about our ability to decide now life and death matters for the people we will be in the future when some part of what makes us the individuals we are-our awareness of ourselves, our past and continuity -has been lost. Dworkin seems to support Dr Ryan's approach in seeing the competent person who makes the anticipatory decision as fundamentally different from and other to the incapacitated individual who lives out (or not) the consequences of the decision. It is widely accepted that individuals can only make advance directives for "themselves". A person who becomes severely mentally disordered, however, is in some sense no longer "herself". Nevertheless, despite the lack of continuity, the former, competent "self' should arguably still retain moral rights about how the later, incompetent self is treated.'5 Even if acknowledged as being not quite the same person, the claim of the competent to decide on behalf of the later incompetent self still appears stronger than the claims of other players, especially bearing in mind the above-mentioned tendency for proxy decisionmakers to choose options inconsistent with the individual's own values.
There is a danger that health professionals and nominated proxies will not take full account of the complex mixture of reasoning which leads some people to choose to forego treatment even in situations where medicine can offer them an extension of life. Although doctors' decisions about lifesaving treatment correlate with their own estimate of subsequent quality of life, they significantly underestimate their elderly patients' quality of life compared with the views of the patients themselves.'6 For some people, medical views of quality of life or possibility of improvement may not be a central issue. Just as Dr Ryan points out that it is difficult for healthy people convincingly to imagine themselves with disability, so it is often hard for the young or middle-aged to envisage that there may be a stage when we have simply lived long enough and the burdens of further treatment no longer outweigh the benefits. We may then wish to opt out even at the risk of potentially missing out on a slightly prolonged lifespan.
(v) We do not agree that advance directives for conditions of temporary mental incapacity should be less valid than advance directives for conditions of permanent mental incapacity. We question the logic of such a distinction. Dr Ryan concedes that his argument does not apply where loss of mental capacity is permanent. He distinguishes this situation as there "will be no possibility of the person recovering to give carers a more accurate report of her current desire for treatment"' and therefore they should be guided by an existing living will. He recognises that an accurate report of individual wishes is of value and therefore should be respected. If, however, a Jehovah's Witness, for example, repeatedly states that under no circumstances does he want a transfusion with blood products, Dr Ryan would urge us to ignore this directive if mental incapacity is temporarily impaired. There is no logical reason why the situation where mental incapacity is temporary should be treated in a different way from the situation where the incapacity is permanent. We feel that in both cases an appropriately worded advance directive should be equally applicable.
Information-sharing (vi) Even if Dr Ryan's arguments are accepted, we do not agree that "there is the possibility of large numbers of people dying when they would not have wanted to" although it may be that some will die when doctors would prefer to keep them alive. Doctors hostile to the concept of advance decisionmaking can limit or otherwise influence patients' choices. The acceptance or refusal of treatment is highly dependent on the amount and manner of information-sharing about the treatment options.17
Discussion with elderly out-patients about limiting treatment rarely occurs'8 and in Emanuel's survey of patient and public opinion, the lack of physician initiative was the most frequently mentioned perceived barrier to the making of advance directives. In this survey of 405 out-patients and 102 members of the public, 93 per cent of the former and 89 per cent of the latter claimed to desire advance directives but considered their doctors to be reluctant.'9 Yet it is to be strongly advised that advance directives are only made in conjunction with advice and information from health professionals.20 Dr Ryan's arguments only apply to advance directives which withhold consent to treatment where there has been a temporary loss of mental capacity. We agree that the greatest value of advance directives is their use in situations where the loss of mental capacity is not reversible, such as in cases of dementia, chronic stroke or chronic brain injury due to trauma.
Nevertheless, we refute his thesis that large numbers of people will die unnecessarily since we believe it unlikely that many people will draft advance directives specifically indicating that they would not want treatment if they were to suffer temporary mental incapacity. 
Conclusion
For the reasons outlined in this paper, we maintain that advance directives refusing treatment during periods of temporary incapacity should be respected. We acknowledge, however, that there are difficulties for healthy people trying to make decisions for future events. It is important that patients are made aware of these difficulties and not discouraged by medical reluctance to discuss the matter so that they draft directives in isolation. Emanuel 
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European Bioethics Seminar
The fifth European Bioethics Seminar, entitled Health Care Issues in Pluralistic Societies, will be held from August 5-9, 1996 , at Nijmegen, the Netherlands. The seminar is organised by the International Program in Bioethics Education and Research. Prominent bioethics scholars from different countries will provide participants with both a formal and practical understanding of contemporary bioethics issues. Special attention will be paid to European traditions in health care ethics. All lectures and plenary sessions will be in English. 
